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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we re-examine the stock market of the 1920s and 1930s for evidence of a
bubble, a "fad" or "herding" behavior by studying individual stock returns. One story often
advanced for the boom of 1928 and 1929 is that it was driven by the entry into the market of
largely uninformed investors, who followed the fortunes of and invested in "favorite" stocks. The
recent theoretical literature on how "noise traders" perturb financial markets is consistent with
this description. The result of this behavior would be a tendency for the favorite stocks' prices
to move together more than would be predicted by their shared fundamentals. Our results
suggest that there was excess comovement in returns even before the boom began, but
comovement increased significantly during the boom and was a signal characteristic of the
tumultuous market of the early 1930s. These results are thus consistent with the possibility that
a fad or crowd psychology played a role in the rise of the market, its crash and subsequent
volatility.
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and NBER New BrUnSWiCIç NJ 08903-5055Financial economists have invested an enormous amount of time
and effort in tasting whether the efficient markets hypothesis
holds for the stock market. When tests for efficiency have failed,
the results have been explained either as deficiencies in the tests
or as evidence for the bubbles, manias and fads of historical
accounts, depending on the convictions of the researchers. Yet,
despite this extensive tasting of the markets, there has been
relatively little effort to examine in detail the specific episodes
that historians have identified as departures from fundamentals.
In this paper, we re—examine the stock market of the 1920s and
l930s for evidence of a bubble by studying individual stock
returns.Most studies examining bubbles, "fads," or "herding"
behavior have focused on stock market indices, but there is no
reason why such departures from an efficient market should be
spread evenly across th. market. One story often advanced for the
boom of 1928 and 1929 is that it was driven in part by the entry
into the market of largely uninformed investors, who followedthe
fortunesof and invested in a ralativsly narrowgroupof certain
"favorit&' stocks. Th. result of this behavior would be a tendency
for th. favorite stocks' prices to move together more than wouldbe
predictedby their fundamentals. In view of this, a symptom of the
type of mispricing believed to have occurredinthe boom andcrash
of1928 to 1929, would be evidence on the tendency of individual
stock prices or returns to move in sympathy for reasons that cannot
be accounted for by shared fundamentals. Our results, which are
based on Pindyck and Rotamberg's (1990, 1992) approach, suggest
that there was excess comovement in returns even before the bconbegan, but comoveinent increased significantly during the boom and
was a signal characteristic of the tumultuous market of the early
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1. The New Crowd in the Market
Most historians and some economists treat the bull market of
the 1920s as an episode when crowd psychology overwhelmed the
fundamentals that should have driven stock prices.The chief
characteristic of these accounts is that it became fashionable to
invest in the stock market——a fad——and a new generation of
unsophisticated investors entered the market eager to make their
fortunes.Allen (1931) and Galbraith (1954) recount how this
enthusiasm, perhaps led by some big speculators, started with two
stocks in early 1928.
Beginning with General Motors and RCA, the market started to
rise with enthusiasm spreading to a larger number of stocks.The
increase in prices was not uniform, and the larger firmsseemed to
be more favored.Both the Dow Jones index, an index of selected
large firms, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve's
index, a value weighted index show the market rising, withan
occasional brief retreat, to a peak in September 1929.However,
Fisher's (1966) equally weighted index, which reveals the fateof
smaller companies, grew much more slowly and reached itspeak in
February 1929. Furthermore, not all large firm's stock prospered,
although certain groups, like banks and utilities, boomed. What
2cannot be discerned from this record is whether the enormous rise
in the price of banks' and utilities' stocks, for example, may be
attributable to some significant improvement in the fundamentals
for these industries or an infectious enthusiasm that spread
through certain parts of the market.
Allen's contemporary history of the period suggests that the
market was driven by an optimism based more on rumor than dividends
and earnings:
The rich man's chauffeur drove with his ears laid back
to catch the news of an impending move in Bethlehem
Steel; he held fifty shares himself on a twenty-point
margin.The window—cleaner at the broker's office
paused to watch the ticker, for he was thinking of
converting his laboriously accumulated savings into a
few shares of Simmons. (p. 315)
While Allen may have highlighted some working class investors for
effect, the stock market does appear to have been invaded by a new
class of small investors who had graduated from government
securities during World War I to bonds and then stocks (White,
1984).Among the most easily identifiable new entrants to the
market were women investors (Galbraith, p. 76). These developments
were reflected and, in turn, stimulated by popular articles, such
as "Everybody Ought to Be Rich" in the August 1929 Ladies Home
Journal. Surveying the psychological literature, Shiller (1984)
suggested that such a surge in new investors is largely driven by
group pressure. Individuals are strongly influenced by the actions
of their friends and acquaintances, and thus a "fad" diffuses
through a society like an epidemic.
Catering to the public's new found interest in securities were
3investment trusts or mutual funds, which enabled the smaller
investor to indirectly buy a portfolio selected by the fund. In
1926, there were 160 such funds.The following year 140 were
formed, in 1928 186 were created and in 1929 265 were established
(Gaibraith, pp. 53—54). Investigating the behavior of the closed
end mutual funds, De Long and Shleifer (1991) discoveredan
anomaly. When the price of a mutual fund is compared to the market
prices of its constituent securities in the post World War II
period, it is most common to observe a discount. However, in the
period of the 1920s bull market there was a very large premium—-
about 45 percent in July 1929.Given that it was feasible to
replicate the composition of any fund, De Long and Shleifer
concluded that the premium was one sign of excessive investor
optimism.
The general picture drawn by these historians and economists
is of a market where the influence of thesmart, well-informed
investor had been substantially reduced while the activities ofthe
more naive newcomers had grown.Recently, De Long, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waidman (1990) have presented a theoretical model
where "noise traders," investors who base their decisionsnot on
market fundamentals of earnings and dividends but irrelevant
information, can move stock prices away from their fundamental
values even in the presence of arbitrage by "smartmoney." The
intuition behind their model is that the unpredictable behaviorof
noise traders makes arbitrage risky. If arbitragers had infinite
horizons, arbitrage would be riskless because they could wait out
4the noise traders; but as their time horizons are finite, they
cannot riskiessly drive the market back to its fundamental values.
The arrival of a new generation of excessively optimistic traders
thus can push the market above its fundamentals and allow them to
earn a higher yield as they willingly accept a disproportionate
share of the risk. In line with the psychological studies, De Long
et. al. have noise traders entering the market in emulation of
previous generations of traders.This model thus appears to shed
some light on a number of financial anomalies, including the mean
reversion in stock returns, the equity premium puzzle, the pricing
of mutual funds and the excess volatility of assets.
2. Testinc for Crowd Behavior
This historical and theoretical literature suggests that stock
prices may depart from their fundamental values. The tests devised
by Shiller (1981) and Le Roy and Porter (1981) are some of the most
common measures of whether arbitragers have guaranteed market
efficiency and kept prices in line with fundamentals.
In the simple efficient markets model, the real price of share
at time t, should be equal to the value of all expected future
dividends discounted at a constant rate.If people follow this
pricing rule, the price may be considered the fundamentals,
perfect foresight or ex post rational price of the stock.The
observed real price of the stock in the market is P.If the
market is efficient, then Pt should be an optimal forecast of P.,
5that is: PtEt(Pt1), where E is the expectation at time t. The
forecast error will be u = P —Ifthis is indeed an optimal
forecast, then Pt and u must be uncorrelated. The variance of the
sumoftwo uncorrelated variables is the sum of the variancesso
that var(P*) = var(P) +var(u).Therefore, var(P*) >var(P)where
the errors are non—zero or the variance of the observed price
should be less than the variance of the fundamentals price.
Examining annual indices of American stock prices and
dividends over the past century, Shiller discovered was that stock
price volatility was five to thirteen times too high to be
attributed to new information about future dividends. This result
was in gross violation of the efficient markets hypothesis, and he
attributed it to crowd psychology. Shiller's remarkablefinding
was subjected to intense criticism and scrutiny by Flavin (1983),
Kleidon (1986), Marsh and Merton (1986) and others forproblems
with the stationarity assumptions and small sampleproperties of
the estimators. The central problem that emerged insubsequent
empirical work was that Shiller-styi.e tests were really joint tests
of a null hypothesis of either market efficiency and a constant
real rate of return with a variable equity premium or market
efficiency and a constant equity premium and a variable rate of
return. The most recent work on the subject by Mankiw, Romuer and
Shapiro (1991) has found very mixed evidence and less striking
violations of these joint hypotheses.
Curious to determine whether Shiller's findings could be
replicated elsewhere, researchers have looked at other stock
6markets. Investigating the British market, Bulkey and Tonks
(1989), did not find any serious violations, although they
concluded that there were still arbitrage opportunities available.
Looking at a longer annual series the British market, De Long and
Grossman (1992) attributed the variance bounds violations to shifts
in the equity premia, suggesting a strong aversion of investors
towards stocks before the First World War. The German stock market
lacks continuous series on stock prices and dividends. But
examining separate periods, De Long and Becht (1992) found that
while the post-World War II market appeared to excessively
volatile, the pre-World War I market was not.They conjectured
that the dominant role of the big German banks may have made the
market less volatile.
The evidence thus compiled does not offer any strong
suggestion that bubbles, manias or fads may play any role.
However, the testing is largely divorced from the historical
literature on these phenomena which claims that they were very
short-lived. The data which all these studies employ are indices
of annual stock prices and dividends, sometimes spliced together
from various sources. The use of this type of annual data implies
that if stock prices are not excessively volatile, then the market
efficiency hypothesis cannot be rejected for very long periods of
time.But, annual data fails significantly to capture what
historians have described as departures from market efficiency,
such as the relatively brief bull markets of 1929 and 1987, which
had durations under two years. Higher frequency price and dividend
7data examined by Rappoport and White (1993) suggest that market
prices in 1929 could not be validated by the expected flow of
future dividends or other factors.
Historical accounts suggest that there should be more
information in individual stocks about the effectsof "crowd
psychology." Yet, while the use of stock indices may be
imperfect, they are proxies for individual stocks. Shiller (1989)
showed that an observation that indices are excessively volatile is
equivalent to an observation that individual stock prices covary
too much on average to accord with the efficient markets
hypothesis.Shiller did not himself look at individual stock
prices. Instead he examined the comovements in real stock price
indices between the U.K. and the U.S. and he found that they appear
to be too large to be accounted for in terms of the comoveinents of
real dividends between countries.
The only studies to examine the behavior of high frequency
individual asset prices are two papers by Pindyck and Roteberg
(1990, 1992) who look at commodities prices and stock prices.
Considering Pt to be a vector of stock returns, they seek to
determine whether once fundamentals are accounted for there isany
significant comovement between observed individual stock returns,
that is, they examine the off-diagonal elements of the var(u)
matrix.
Pindyck and Rotexnberg (1992) show that there are two possible
sources of comovement of the returns of correctly priced stocks:
changes in the discount rate for the immediate holding period
8(which is the same for all firms), and correlated revisions of the
expected present discounted value of the future earnings streams.
Changes in the discount rate should be reflected by macroeconomic
variables that affect the overall level of returns in the economy.
Revisions in expectations may be correlated between firms in
related activities. Thus, there is evidence of excessive
comovement of returns if, after controlling for these macroeconomic
and industry effects, returns are still correlated across firms.
In their study covering 1969 to 1987, Pindyck and Rotemberg
formed groups of companies in unrelated lines of business. As a
check on this independence, they showed that earnings of the firms
in each group were uncorrelated over time. This fact supports the
presumption that any within-group correlation of returns must be
due to common responses to underlying macroeconomic factors. They
then regressed the time series of returns for each firm on
macroeconomic variables designed to capture temporal variation in
discount rates that result from economy—wide developments. These
variables included current and lagged values of the growth of
industrial production and prices, the 3-month T-bill rate, the
lagged dividend price ratio for the market as a whole, and the
contemporaneous rate of return on the market. The residuals from
these regressions should be uncorrelated for firms within each
group, if stocks are correctly priced, because sources of
coinovement have been removed. Pindyck and Roteznberg show that the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the null of a diagonal
covariance matrix (no excess comovement of the stock returns in a
9group) is RI(T/2) whereR is the estimated correlation matrix of
returns, and T is the number of time series observations. Minus
twice the log of this statistic has a chi—square distribution with
m(rn-l)/2 degrees of freedom, where inisthe number of firms in the
group. In a further test they include latent variables to capture
unobserved market expectations. For all models the null hypothesis
of no excess cornovement was clearly rejected.
The appearance of additional cornovement between stock returns
suggests the possibility that there is some contagion or infection
between stocks. If investors were only following fundamentalsthen
the movement of one stock should not be related to anotheronce all
fundamentals have been accounted for.If they do move together
then investors may be behaving as noise tradersusing the
"irrelevant" information from other stock prices to pricea stock.
A rise in the value of a few stocks may lead these investorsto re-
evaluate other stocks simply because they believe thisis an
indication that the rest of the market should rise. However,
Pindyck and Rotemberg do not believe that this is the case and
offer some additional evidence the observed comovement isthe
product of company size and degree of institutionalownership,
suggesting market segmentation.
3. Testing for Crowd Behavior in the l920s and l930s
To examine the behavior of individual stocks,we have
assembled a new body of data, consisting of the individual end-of-
10month prices of 29 of the 30 stocks that composed the Dow Jones
Index in 1929 and their dividends from 1920 to 1934. Before 1926,
the Wall Street Journal and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle
supplied stock prices. For the period 1926-1934, the CRSP tapes
provided the price data. Dividends for the whole period were found
in Moody's Manual of Investments. Individual stock prices and
dividends were adjusted to correct for stock splits and stock
dividends as recorded in Moody's.
This sample of stocks includes some stocks that were prominent
in contemporary accounts but also some that were quiescent. The
stocks in the Dow Jones Index for 1929 were selected because most
had been on the New York Stock Exchange for long enough to provide
a decent time series.1However, not all of them had been in
existence or been listed on the New York Stock Exchange as far back
as 1920.2
Figure 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and
kurtosis for this cross—section of stock returns over the whole
period. Perhaps, the most striking feature of these four plots is
1The index at this date had thirty stocks; up until September
29, 1928, there had been only twenty. The stocks in the index
changed little from September 1928 to July 18, 1930, when there was
a turnover of seven companies.In 1929, there were only two
changes, National Cash Register was substituted for Victor Talking
Machine in January and Curtiss—Wright for Wright Aeronautical in
September. (Stil].man, 1986, p. 56). Only 29 stocks were used in
this sample. Recent creations--National Cash Register and Curtiss-
Wright-—were not employed and data for Victor Talking Machine was
not found.
is worthwhile to note that in the early 1920s, trading
among even prominent stocks could be quite limited.During the
months of July and August quotations were difficult to find before
1929.
11that one must look quite carefully to locate the boom beginning in
March 1928 and the crash of October 1929. For ready
identification, these dates are marked by vertical dashed lines.
Note that the most dramatic movements occurred during the
turbulence of the early 1930s.It is difficult to establish a
reasonable benchmark against which the experience of 1928-1929 can
be compared. One candidate is the "Coolidge market" (Galbraith,
pp. 14—15) during which prices rose almost steadily from mid—1924
to the end of 1925, which is similarly marked by vertical dashed
lines. In contrast to the boom of 1928—1929, the upward movement
during the Coolidge market is quite homogeneous across stock
returns.3 The standard deviations in 1928—1929 are higher, an
stock returns are more skewed and show more bunching in the tails.
If these two episodes were both based on a general improvement in
business conditions, then there should be no marked difference
between them.While a growing economy certainly underlay the
general rise in stocks in 1928 and 1929, their performance was
extraordinarily uneven. The second, third and fourth moments of
the stock returns suggest considerable divergenceamong the
experiences of individual stocks.Barrie Wigmore (1985, P. 86)
noted this phenomenon in his detailed analysis of the performance
of a broad range of stocks.Me concluded that "exaggerated
valuations" were "for individual companies rather than whole
industries." Thus, excess comovement of the market is not easily
3me number of stocks during the Coolidge marketwas slightly
smaller.
12ascertained from the behavior of stock returns alone.
We adopt the framework developed by Pindyck and Rotemberg to
test for comovement, subject to the limitations of our data. These
limitations affect the way we control for shared industry effects.
The small size of the sample of firms we have prevents the
selection of a sufficiently large number of nonoverlapping groups
of firms. Furthermore, we do not have earnings data on the firms,
to provide a check on independence. Consequently, we calculate the
comovement test statistics for a large number of groups of six
firms selected from our 29, using a random sampling procedure. For
brevity and clarity, we shall refer to these randomly selected
groups of six firms as subsets. Each subset of firms contains no
more than one firm from the each of the eight industrial categories
detailed in Table 1, with the probability of a particular
industrial category appearing in a subset is equal to that
category's preponderance in the population of 29 firms. Thus, for
example, there is a chance of 2/29 that any subset will include a
firm in the retailing category, while there is a 5/29 chance that
it will contain an automobile industry firm. Then, given a subset
that contains a retailing firm, there will be an equal chance that
the firm is Sears or Woolworths, and so forth.
This sampling procedure ensures that none of the industrial
categories will be over— or under—represented relative to its
presence in the group of 29 firms, while the use of results from a
large number of randomly sampled subsets guards against
arbitrariness in developing the subsets. It raises the further
13problem of the appropriate critical value for the test.The 1
percent critical value for the null of no coinovement among a single
subset of six firms (15 degrees of freedom) is 30.6; however, our
random sampling procedure generates a large number of such test
statistics from subsets of firms whose membership differs but
nevertheless overlaps with high probability. We are thus faced
with assessing the significance of a list of chi—square statistics
among which there is a complicated pattern of statistical
dependence. Accordingly, we develop critical values by Monte Carlo
simulation. Each run of the simulation is based on 29 T—vectors of
independent standard normal variates, each representing an firm.
These 29 vectors are partitioned into industry groups with numbers
of members corresponding to those in Table 1. One hundred subsets
of six firms are then selected, according to the protocol described
above, and the comovement statistics calculated for each subset.
Each run mimics the dependence due to overlapping firms among the
subsets, while ensuring that the data on which the correlation
statistics are based are genuinely independent. For each run, we
tabulated the number of the one hundred comoveinent statistics that
exceed the 1 percent (upper) critical values for a single chi-
square statistic with 15 degrees of freedom (m6). We then carried
out 1000 such runs, producing a distribution, under the null
hypothesis, of the number of rejections (individual comovemerit
statistics in excess of 30.6) among 100 subsets of the same
underlying returns data.The upper 5 percent and 1 percent
critical values of this distribution are shown in Table 2.
14Our tests for comovement among the returns of firms are based
on residuals obtained from time series regressions for each firm's
returns on variants of the list of regressors used by Pindyck and
Rotemberg. We experimented with current and/or one lag of the
growth rates of aggregate industrial production (DIP), wholesale
and consumer prices (DWP and DCP), the contemporaneous rate of
interest on 90—day bankers' acceptances (BA), the seasonally-
adjusted, lagged (equal—weighted) dividend-price ratio for the
stocks in the sample (DVP(-l)), and the contemporaneous (equal
weighted) return on the stocks in the sample, which we call the
"market return" (MR). The results of these regressions are not
shown; curiously, very few of the macroeconomic variables display
any significance, a result similar to Pindyck and Rotemberg's
finding for their sample. In contrast to their results, we find
that the lagged dividend-price ratio for the market is of little
use in predicting individual returns. The only variable that has
marked explanatory power is MR.
Table 2 exhibits the results for comovement tests on firms'
residuals derived from four sets of regressors. Sets (a) and (b)
are similar to those used by Pindyck and Rotemberg; set (C)drops
the lagged macro variables in (a), and (d) employs only the market
return. Each comovement test is run on residuals from monthly
regressions over three different samples: 1920.02—26.12, 1927.01-
30.12, and 1931.01—1934.12. Within each sample, the results are
uniform across models (a)—(d). After attempting to control for
potential economy-wide and industry-specific sources of comovement
15among stock returns we still find very strong evidence for
cotnovement. The null of no comovement is rejected at the 1 percent
level in every case. However, there is least evidence of
comovernent when only the market return is used in the preliminary
regressions4.In general, these results are similar to those
found by Pindyck and Rotemberg.5
By looking at the comovement of stock prices across three
periods we found a surprising pattern, which allows us to draw a
different interpretation from the one suggested by Pindyck and
Rotemberg. Their finding of substantial excess comoveinent is open
to a common criticism of all studies that do not accept the market
efficiency hypothesis that they have not adequately accounted f or
fundamentals.Hamilton (1986) and Hamilton and Whiteman (1985)
have shown that if there is some fundamental unobserved by the
econometrician but known to the market participants, then asset
prices will not appear to be driven by fundamentals. The problem
is that what researchers are conducting is a joint test
specification test for fundamentals and market efficiency.
Consequently, Pindyck and Rotemberg look for an explanation
elsewhere and find that some of the excess comovement can be partly
explained by company size and degree of institution ownership,
Notice that there is no presumption that the evidence for
comovement will necessarily be lessened by including more
(potentially spurious) variables in the preliminary regressions.
While this lowers the variance of the return residuals for an
individual firm, it may lower the covariance of return residuals
across firms by a greater or lesser amount.
5We did not include latent variables in any of the regressions
in this version of the paper.
16suggesting market segmentation.
Pindyck and Rotemberg's explanation is a plausible one for
their broad selection of stocks.However, it is difficult to
imagine that for stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial average that
any shift in market segmentation could have occurred over the three
periods we examine. The noise trading approach seems to offer a
more plausible explanation for our results.Because of the
uniformity of results across models of individual firm returns, it
is useful in comparing the results across time periods, to focus
only on row (d).First, there is a distinct rise in comovernent
between stock returns from the pre-boom period to the boom. There
is excess comovement for 1920 to 1926 but it rises to 1927 to 1930.
This fact accords with the historical suggestions of the entrance
of a new generation of unschooled investors responding to hot tips,
rumors and a general euphoria.What is surprising is that
comovement seems even stronger in the third period, 1931-1934. On
the face of it, the bubble may have burst and the naive or semi-
naive investors had dropped out of the market. However, we do know
that by any measure this was the period of the greatest volatility
in over two hundred years of the American stock market (Wilson,
Sylla, and Jones, 1991).This volatility was drive by constant
domestic and foreign economic policy surprises.6 Investors were
clearly shaken by the events of the l93Os, and they may very well
have been so nervous that they reacted even more to the change in
6Eznploying an options-pricing approach to the brokers' loan
market, Rappoport and White (1994) found that actual or realized
volatility was much higher than expected or implied volatility.
17the prices of other stocks than to the specific stock fundamentals
or economy-wide fundamentals.The "crowd" was now nervous and
apprehensive.
4. Conclusion -
Whetherthe efficient markets hypothesis accurately describes
the behavior of the stock market in the 1920s will continue to be
a subject of heated debate for the future given the imperfect
methodology for testing and the strongly held beliefs of
researchers. However, the exercise conducted in this paper
suggests that stock returns paralleled one another too closely to
be explained by any common industry or economy-wide factors that we
could measure. Our results are thus consistent with the
possibility that a fad or crowd psychology played a role in the
rise of the market, its crash and subsequent volatility. Yet, the
possibility remains that, in spite of our use of a broad range of
macroeconomic variables, we have not succeeded in extracting all
the common factors that drove stock prices. Our statistical
analysis of comovement is subject to problems of errors-in-
variables, arising from the fact that we have used realized values
of returns and other variables to test theories that in fact deal
with anticipations.
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Chemicals: Allied Chemical, Texas Gulf and Sulphur, Union Carbide
Automotive: Chrysler, General Motors, Goodrich, Mack Truck, Nash
Primary Metals: American Smelting and Refining, Bethlehem Steel,
International Nickel, U.S. Steel, American Can
Food: American Sugar, American Tobacco, General Foods
Oil: Atlantic Refining, Texas Corporation, Standard Oil of New
Jersey, North American Company
Retailing: Sears Roebuck, Woolworth
Machinery and Equipment: Westinghouse, International Harvester,
General Railway Signal
New Industries: Paramount, RCA, and Wright AeronauticalTAflLE 2
Tosta foComo'rement of..In5ividuaj Firms' Stock Prices
Nuiberorsubsets of six firmsyielding
comoveinent statistics in excess of 30.6'
(Maximum possible —100)




DCP,DCP(—1),DVP(—1),BA 91 100 100
(D)As(a), plus MR 13 21 52
(C)DIP,DWP,DCP,DVP(—1),BA 91 100 100
(d) MR 10 18 45
Critical Values3
5% 6 6 6
1% 3 8 8
1 The tests for comovenient examine whether returns ofgroups
of six firms in different industries are mutually correlated, after
correcting for shared macroeconomic influences on returns. The
flumber30.6is the 1% significance level for the likelihood ratio
test of the null thatthecovariance zatrix of (residual) returns
is a diagonal matrix. For each model of individual firmreturns,
one ht.thdreddifferentpermutations ("subsets")ofsix individual
firms in different industries were randomly selected from the 29
firmaonwhich data were available.The entries in the table
report thenumberof these100subsets that produce rejection of
thediagonal covariance matrix null. An entryinexcess of 6(8) is
cignificant at the 5%(3%) level. See text,pp.8—i0,forcomplete
details.
2 All data are monthly. DVPisthe seasonally
adjustedaggregate dividend-price ratio, BA is the rate on 90-day
bankers' acceptances, and MRtheaverage return on the 29 Dow Jones
cecurities. DIP, DWP, and DCP are, respectively, the monthly rates
of change in industrial production, wholesale prices and consumer
prices.
Based on 1000 simulations using 50 and 100 time series
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